The literature typically treats fertility reduction in developing countries as a result of women's status improvement, based on the assumption that women have greater decision making power on childbearing as their status improves. This paper investigates whether and how fertility decline leads to reduction in gender inequality and the improvement of women's status in China, where the fertility decline was mainly resulted from the state policy intervention. Based on the analyses of data from two nationally representative surveys, we show that women with fewer children do less housework and are more satisfied with their status within family. Such effects are more pronounced for women in more recent marital cohorts. Across generations, lower fertility implies fewer siblings and daughters may have benefited more in terms of years of schooling and subsequently occupational attainment.
INTRODUCTION
Scholars studying fertility decline in developing countries tend to focus on changing gender relationships and improvement of women's status as key causes of fertility decline (Mason 1987 ). Women's education and labor force participation are two common indictors of women's socioeconomic status. In many developing countries, education increases at a faster pace for women than it does for men and gender gaps in schooling are also shrinking (Buchmann and Hannum 2001) . Consequently, female labor force participation has increased in most countries and women have gained more economic independence over time (Brinton, Lee, and Parish 1995; Buchmann, DiPrete, and Anne McDaniel 2008) .
Empirical research has shown that fertility is negatively associated with women's education and employment (Mason 1987) , not only because women's improved education exposes them to modern values and ideas that emphasize individualism and gender egalitarianism (Inglehart and Norris 2003) , but also because women's economic independence enables them to decide for themselves the number of children they desire (Mason 1987) . In other words, women's increasing educational attainment and labor force participation has contributed to fertility decline in most developing countries (Jejeebhoy 1995; Lam and Duryea 1999) .
While fertility reduction in developing countries was seen mainly as a result of women's enhanced status, the social consequences of fertility decline, especially in promoting gender equality within marriage/family and beyond, nevertheless, have been rarely addressed in the literature (but see Zhu, Li, et. al. 1997) . China provides a particularly interesting case to shed lights on the latter process, because the country's fertility decline since the 1970s is not linked to trends in gender equality in either education or employment, but rather is directly caused by a change in the state birth control policy.
Indeed, since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the visible hand of the socialist state has thus played a strong role in driving the changes in women's employment, education and fertility at different paces according to its policy agenda in different historical periods. For instance, the female labor force participation rates have been always high in China until recently, thanks to various social policies to promote gender egalitarianism (Honig and Hershatter 1988) . 1 Such a high rate of female labor force participation was a direct consequence not so much of their improved educational opportunities relative to men's (Hannum and Xie 1994; Lu and Treiman 2008) , because gender inequality in education fluctuated in the first three decades of the People's Republic of China, and only in recent years has the country witnessed a dramatic improvements in women's education relative to men's, largely due to economic development and educational expansion since the 1980s (Hannum 2005) .
In this paper, we aim to chart the complicated and dynamic pathways through which the process of women's status improvement and fertility decline enhance each other, 2 and focus on the social impact of fertility reduction on the improvement of women's status both within marriage/family and in society. Based on the data from two national representative surveys conducted in 2000 and 2006, in a general analytical framework, we test a set of hypotheses on the association between child birth and women's status within family, and, across generations, between the sibship size and women's educational attainment relative to men's.
Finally, we highlight the role of marriage and family as important agents in resource allocation in understanding the unintended consequences of fertility decline in China as well as in many other developing countries in the second half of the 20 th century.
CHILD BIRTH AND THE PATHWAY TO WOMEN'S STATUS IMPROVEMENT: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In very general terms, women's status improvement is a dynamic process and many factors contribute to the reduction of gender gaps. This trend is based on the fact that women were historically disadvantaged in the gendered division of labor. While men were bread winners of families and dominated the gender relationship, women were responsible for human reproduction and household chores. The role differential, legitimized through either economic calculation or gender ideology (Becker 1991; Goldscheider and Waite 1986) , expects married women to give birth, raise children, and take care of domestic work.
Women's economic dependence upon their spouses makes their education and employment unnecessary and thereby their subordination to men inevitable.
Child birth is an important life event that fulfills one of women's principal gender roles.
As discussed in the introduction section, a common argument is that the improvement of women's socioeconomic status, as measured by education and labor force participation, has led to the fertility decline (Jejeebhoy 1995; Mason 1987) . Formal schooling not only equips women with knowledge and skills for economic activities in the labor markets but also serves as a crucial catalyst for changes in values and gender ideology (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Stember 1961; Thornton 1983) . From a sociological perspective, women's economic and social independence resulting from their improved education are increasingly incompatible with their traditional role as mothers and homemakers. On the one hand, an increase in schooling often delays women's marriage and reduces the duration of women's reproductive period. On the other hand, women may be increasingly able to limit the number of children to have because employment has rendered them more economically independent and the opportunity cost of having children would also be greater, especially for those better educated and with higher career aspirations. Educated women have gained more access to and acceptance of birth control, greater knowledge of health practices that reduce infant and child mortality.
Nevertheless, such a causal link captures only one part of the complicated relationship between women's changing socioeconomic status and declining fertility. Although most women gave birth only after they have left school and completed education (Bledsoe and Casterline et.al. 1999; Rindfuss and Morgan 1996) , decisions on birth and employment might be intertwined. In other words, because of the dual role played by women as mothers and homemakers, while empowered women may be able to make birth decisions, child birth and family obligations may also hinder career development and earnings growth (Staff and Mortimer 2012) . Due to gender asymmetry in the division of domestic labor, working women are still required to spend a substantial amount of time on housework, making it difficult to strike a balance between career and family (Blossfeld 1995) . Many women opt to withdraw from the labor force at a certain life stage to take care of their children and families, and even more choose careers that are more "suitable" for women so that they could fulfill their prescribed gender roles (Jao and Li 2012) . Therefore, a reverse causality may also exist: marriage and subsequent childbirth (fertility) may yield negative effects on women's career development and earnings.
In this case, it is clear that not only is women's status relative to men's affected by the visible hand of the state, also subject to marriage and family relationship constraints. In other words, to understand the process of women's status change at the societal level, particular attention needs to be paid to women's relative status to their marital spouses within the family. For a married woman, a key variable adversely associated with her labor market attainment is childbearing. Because of gender role differentials in childrearing and traditional gender ideology exhorting women to spend more time on taking care of their husbands and children, women tend to spend more time on domestic housework than their spouses. As a result, the tension between work and household labor is more pronounced for women than for men (England and Farkas 1986) , and married women tend to reduce the amount of effort they invest into their careers (Becker 1991) . Therefore, a woman's number of births has important implications for her share of housework and time commitment to her family, both of which would distract her from work and career advancement in the labor market. 3 Moreover, there is a second pathway through which childbirth affects women's (daughter's) process of status improvement. Women's number of births indicates the sibship size of their children's generation, an important feature that characterizes the structure of the family. Sociologists have shown a continuing interest in identifying factors that affect intra-family resource allocation for children's educational advancement, among which a prominent one is sibship size (Cicirelli 1978; Heer 1985; Steelman et al. 2002) .
Previous literature on the effect of sibling configuration has consistently shown that sibship size is negatively associated with an individual's educational attainment (Steelman et. al. 2002) . A common explanation for the effect of sibship size on educational attainment is the resource dilution thesis. Some familial resources, such as parental interactions with children, affect children's intellectual development and thus educational attainment indirectly; other resources, such as financial resources which reduce the need for children to leave school to contribute to family incomes, affect educational attainment directly (Downey 1995) . According to Blake (1981) , the amount of resources that can be allocated to any given child depends on both the total amount of resources and the number of children in the family.
The larger the sibship size, the closer the child spacing, the greater the dilution of family resources, and in turn the lower the educational attainment of each child.
The allocation of educational resources could also depend on the gender composition of siblings and parental preferences on investment in children's education, especially in developing countries. Chu, Xie, and Yu (2007) revealed that the negative effects of sibship size on educational attainment in Taiwan were the strongest for girls who had younger brothers and sisters. Under the strong influence of the Chinese patriarchal culture, couples with more children were more likely to be constrained by family resources for children's education, and they typically had higher expectations on sons and tend to invest more in their sons' education than in their daughters'. With limited resources available, girls were more likely than boys to give up schooling and work to support their brothers' education, especially in the East Asian context (Chu, Xie, and Yu 2007) .
The birth control policies in China since the early 1970s have lowered fertility rate and changed sibship size, thus have had significant implications for family investment in children's education and thereby educational gender inequality. For Chinese couples who abide by the state's one-child policy, their investment in children's education would not be biased toward sons for two reasons: they are typically better off than those who have more than one child and thus are subject to less resource constraints; they will invest in their only child regardless of the child's gender. Research has shown a substantial reduction in the mean differences in schooling between men and women in China, especially for the young cohort born after the one-child policy was implemented (Wu and Zhang 2010) , and fertility decline could be an important factor accounting for the reduction in women's disadvantage in education. (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005) . Consequently, the population grew rapidly from 541,670,000 in 1952 to 829,920,000 in 1970, reaching a peak in the natural growth rate of 33.33 per thousand in 1963 (National Bureau of Statistics 2009, p. 1).
Figure 1. Analytic Framework: Childbearing and the Pathway to Women's Status Improvement
Concerned that overpopulation could hinder economic development and the improvement of living standards, the Chinese government rolled out the first national birth control campaign in 1971, with the slogan "later-longer-fewer" (Wan Xi Shao), referring to later marriage, longer birth spacing, and fewer children (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005; Presser et al. 2006) . A more stringent one-child policy was implemented when China started its economic reform in 1978. To limit the total population to 1.2 billion by 2000, the new Constitution of the People's Republic of China in 1978 declared state advocacy for birth planning, and the Marriage Law of 1980 required every couple to abide by the birth control policy (Greenhalgh 2008) . As a result, the total fertility rate dropped from 5.8 children per woman in 1970 to 2.7 in 1979, and was further reduced to 1.5 by the late 1990s (Poston et al. 2006 
+
Fertility decline in China since the 1970s has yielded many profound economic and social consequences witnessed in the 1980s and afterwards, such as economic growth, population aging, and improvements in children's wellbeing and gender inequality (Zhu, Li, et al. 1997) . Given the fact that the fertility decline in China largely resulted from state policy intervention rather than increase in women's socioeconomic status, as measured by the improvements in education and labor force participation, we focus on a part of the complex model in the analytical framework outlined in Figure 1 above, namely, how fertility decline has enhanced women's status both within and outside their families. The China case would allow one to better handle the reverse causality issue when looking at the relationship between fertility decline and gender inequality.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
We attempt to answer two sets of questions in this paper by proposing and testing six hypotheses. First, does the number of children that a married woman has affect her share of housework and satisfaction with her status within the family and marriage? And how these effects change over time the effect (i.e., from one cohort to another)? Second, how does the changing sibship size resulting from the decline in parental fertility affect educational and occupational attainment relative to men's?
Our empirical analysis is divided into two parts. We argue that lower fertility increases married women's status and wellbeing relative to their husbands' (men) within the family.
Time allocation and division of household work are important indicators of women's power status. As fertility declines, women on the whole spend shorter periods of their overall lifespan on childbearing and childrearing, therefore the number of births has significant implications for their family lives and careers. Because of gender role expectations, even if a married woman, like her husband, holds a job, she is expected to devote more time and effort to children and family as a wife and a mother. The more children she has, the more attention and time she needs to devote to family life. This is also the case in the context of Chinese society (Yu and Xie 2012) . Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The more children a woman has, the larger her share of housework would be relative to her husband's share within the family.
Because of the increase in education and labor force participation, women's compliance with traditional gender roles may not be voluntary. Instead, not only may the tension between family and work hinder their career development, it may also affect their perceived status within the family, for which Hypothesis 2 is testable.
Hypothesis 2. The more children a woman has, the less satisfied she would be with her self-perceived status in the family.
We examine two dimensions of women's status within marriage and family in relation to fertility: their share of housework and their satisfaction with their perceived status in the family. A reduction in the number of child births across each cohort contributes to less of a burden on women in terms of housework and greater satisfaction with their perceived status in the family. Within the same marriage cohort, however, women who give birth to more children against the general trend of declining fertility are subject to a larger burden of housework and are less satisfied with their status within the family. Hypothesis 3 is thus proposed.
Hypothesis 3. The negative effect of childbearing on women's status tends to be stronger in younger cohorts than in older cohorts.
Across generations, lower fertility implies fewer siblings for the next generation. It is well known that an individual's educational attainment is negatively associated with sibship size. Due to resource constraints and son preference, parents with more children tend to sacrifice the wellbeing of girls for better education for boys. As typically observed in Chinese societies, girls tend to leave school earlier and earn cash income to help support their brothers' education (Chu, Xie and Yu 2007) . This fact provides another perspective of in looking at the gender disparities in educational and other socioeconomic outcomes. In other words, because of son preference, daughters in a Chinese family with a mixture of sons and daughters tend to be disadvantaged in schooling. We expect a first-order interaction between gender and sibship size in educational attainment which can be tested in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. Women's disadvantage in education is larger for those with more siblings.
A similar hypothesis can be posed with regard to the effect of sibship size on gender inequality in occupational attainment, although the effect may be indirect and may occur through education.
Hypothesis 5. Women's disadvantage in occupational attainment is larger for those with more siblings.
Because fertility decline yields fewer siblings in the children's generation, those with more siblings against the trend may be placed in a more disadvantaged position. We expect the detrimental effect of sibship size on women's educational attainment relative to men's to be even stronger across birth cohorts and propose our last hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6. The negative effects of sibship size on women's status are more pronounced among the younger cohorts than among the older cohorts.
DATA, VARIABLES, AND MEASURES

Data
To examine the impact of fertility and women aged between 18 and 57 at the time of the survey. We assume that those who aged 18 or above come from family with parents having completed childbearing.
Variables and Methods
For the first part of the analysis using WSS2000, we employ two dependent variables to The key independent variable is the number of children the respondent has, which is treated as a continuous variable in the analysis. Other control variables are education, work status, residence, and marriage cohort. Education is coded into four levels: primary school or below, junior high school, senior high school, and college or above. These levels are treated as a set of dummy variables in multivariate models. Work status is a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the respondent was involved in any paid work at the time of the survey (1 if yes and 0 otherwise). Rural residence is also a dummy variable. To examine the temporal trends, we split all respondents into four marriage cohorts based on the year they were married : 1952-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1990, and 1991-2000. 6 For the second part of the analysis using the data from the CGSS2006, the dependent variables are educational attainment, measured by the number of years of schooling completed as a continuous variable, and occupational status, measured by the International Socioeconomic Index of Occupations (ISEI), ranging in principle from 0 to 100 (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman 1992) .
In this part of the analysis, our central interest is in how gender inequality in education is affected by sibship size over time. Therefore, the key independent variable is the respondent's gender, which is coded as a dummy variable (female=1), with sibship size when the respondent was aged 10 as a/the continuous variable. In this way we measure the sibling effect on the dilution of family resources for children's educational advancement when they grew up.
Family socioeconomic background is an important predictor of educational attainment.
We use two proxy measures of family background as control variables: the household registration status, also known as hukou, and father's occupational status when the respondent was age 18. One's hukou status has important causal effect on educational attainment (Wu 2012) , although people can change hukou later in their life, mostly by receiving higher education (Wu and Treiman 2004) . We take the current hukou status (if the respondent has never changed hukou) or hukou status at age 7 (if the respondent has changed hukou) as the respondent's hukou origin to examine its impact on educational attainment. Father's occupation at the time when the respondent was aged 18 is another indicator of the influence of family background, especially the financial capacity of a family to support its children's education. It is also measured by the ISEI.
Because the second part of the analysis includes both men and women, regardless of marital status, we use birth cohorts instead of marriage cohorts to approximate periodic variations (see footnote 5). Birth cohorts are coded into three categories: 1949-1970, 1971-1978, and 1979-1988 , corresponding to the changes in China's birth control policy. The first cohort was not subject to birth control policies; the second cohort was born during China's first national birth control campaign that began in 1971; and the third cohort was born after China started implementing its strict one-child policy in 1979. We expect women's educational attainment to increase and sibship size declines across birth cohorts.
For both data sets, we use sampling weights to correct for this oversampling to compute figures representative of the general population in China. The clustering effect on principal sampling units is also taken into account and robust standard errors are presented.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Fertility Decline and Women's Status within Family
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the selected variables from WSS2000 among the entire sample and also for four marriage cohorts. Overall, among Chinese couples, 77.8 percent of wives perform more housework than husbands on average, despite some variations across different marriage cohorts, especially for those married between 1971-1980 and 1981-1990 , who may still have non-adult children or aged parents to take care of. On the other hand, most women seem to be satisfied with their family status, although younger cohorts are slightly less satisfied than older cohorts. We examine the relationship between fertility and women's status within family as measured by two indicators. 1952-1970 and 1971-1980 , the number of children they have does not affect their share of housework, whereas for those married during 1981-1990 and 1991-2000 , the number of children significantly increases their share of housework. One additional child increases the net odds of sharing more housework by 4.18
percent (e 0.041 -1) for those married between 1952 and 1970, 7.47 percent (e 0.072 -1) for those married between 1971 and 1980, 16.9 percent (e 0.156 -1) for those married between 1981 and 1990, and 47.7 percent (e 0.390 -1) for those married between 1991 and 2000. The chi-square tests show that such increases across different equations are statistically significant (p<.01). 8
In Table 3 , we examine how fertility affects women's satisfaction with their own perceived status within family. Results show that the number of children has a negative impact on women's satisfaction with their own family status. Other things being equal, one additional child reduces the net odds of being more satisfied by 7.96 percent (1-e -0.083 ), and the effect is statistically significant (p<.05). Education affects women's satisfaction with their family status non-monotonically. Those women with high school education are more satisfied than both women with primary education or below and women with college education or above. Again, women in the younger marriage cohorts are less satisfied than those in the older marriage cohorts. Perhaps young generation of women are butting up against the continuing hurdles to attaining real positions of power; they are more educated but shoulder more dual burden between housework/childcare and labor market participation.
Again, we replicate models by each marriage cohort. As predicted by Hypothesis 4, the negative effect of fertility on the satisfaction with family status is more prominent in the younger cohorts than in the older cohorts, and the difference is statistically significant (p<.05). Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors adjusted for clustering in counties. *** p<0.001, **p<0.01, * p<0.05.
In sum, the results of ordinal logistic regression consistently show that fertility is negatively associated with women's status in the family and the effects are more prominent for younger marriage cohorts than for older marriage cohorts with the decline in fertility.
Hypotheses 1-3 are all supported.
Fertility Decline and Gender Inequality across Generations
We proceed to examine how sibship size affects educational attainment and occupational achievement in terms of the status of a first job for women as compared to men in the children's generation. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for selected variables from CGSS2006. We see that both the years of schooling and the status of the first occupation increase across the cohorts, while sibship size declines from 3.5 for those born before 1970 to 1.6 for those born after 1979. Indeed, the percentage of those who are an only child increases from 4.1 percent for the first cohort to 17.1 percent for the third cohort. 1949-1970 1971-1978 1979-1988 Years of schooling 7.8 7.0 8.7 9.6 (4.0) (4.0) Model 1, we include gender, sibship size, father's ISEI, hukou origin, and cohort as the independent variables in the models. 9 Results confirm a significant gender gap in schooling.
Other things being equal, women still receive about 1.3 fewer years of schooling than men.
Having more siblings decreases educational attainment for both men and women. One additional sibling reduces an individual's schooling by 0.24 years; educational attainment increases across time/cohorts. Those who were born in 1971-1978 and 1979-1988 are more educated than those who were born in 1949-1970, by 1.54 years and 2.22 years, respectively.
The effects of other control variables are as expected: people with urban hukou and children from better socioeconomic backgrounds do enjoy significant advantages in education.
The results in Model 1 provide a benchmark for subsequent analyses. In Model 1a, we examine how the effect of sibship size on schooling differs by gender by adding an interaction term. Results show that having more siblings is more detrimental to women's schooling than it is to men's. The non-significant coefficient for the main effect term suggests that the influence of sibship size on schooling is negligible for men, but the significant coefficient of the interaction term indicates a much larger impact on women. Other things being equal, an extra sibling decreases a man's schooling by 0.079 years and a woman's schooling by 0.382 years (0.079+0.303). The difference is statistically significant (p<0.001).
The evidence lends support to Hypothesis 4, that is, women's disadvantage in education is larger for those with more siblings.
We further break down the sample into three birth cohorts, 1949-1970, 1971-1978, and 1979-1988 , and run separate analyses for each cohort. Models 2, 3, and 4 in Table 6 are additive models, confirming the trend in an educational gender gap shown in Table 5 . There is no significant difference in schooling between men and women in the youngest cohort (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) which is affected by the one-child policy. Birth Cohort: 1949 -1970 Birth Cohort: 1971 -1978 Birth Cohort: 1979 -1988 Model 1 includes an interaction term between gender and sibship size. We do not run these models separately for each cohort as in Table 6 , since gender difference in the effect of sibship size does not vary by cohort.
Similar to what was observed for educational attainment, the status of a woman's first occupation tends to be lower than that of a man's first occupation, by 2.308 points, other things being equal. Those with more siblings are also more disadvantaged, and an additional sibling reduces the occupational status by 0.243 points. The statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term between gender and sibship size suggests that women with more siblings are even more disadvantaged in occupational status attainment compared to men (p<.001). This result is consistent with Hypothesis 5.
Note that in the models above, we did not include education as an independent variable.
Once the years of schooling is controlled for in Models 2 and 2a, the effects of gender, sibship size, and their interaction terms all become insignificant, but education becomes a strong predictor of occupational attainment, as shown by the classic Blau-Duncan status attainment models. Therefore, we conclude that China's fertility decline and the resulting small sibship size has had a direct effects on the changing gender inequality in education, whereas gender inequality in occupational attainment is largely due to the effect of education. Women who were born into families with more siblings tended to be less educated, and consequently, were more likely to start in a first job of lower-status. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we elucidate the complicated and dynamic pathways through which the process of women's status improvement and fertility decline enhance each other. We highlight the impact of fertility reduction on the improvement of women's status in two ways.
First, giving birth/child rearing may affect women's status within marriage and family.
Second, the small sibship size resulting from fertility decline enhances girls' education, thus contributing to the reduction of educational gender inequality in their daughters' generation.
In both pathways, marriage and family serve as important agents in resource allocation (between women and their husbands and between sons and daughters) in the context of fertility decline.
Given the fact that fertility decline in China since the 1970s largely resulted from state policy intervention rather than women's improved socioeconomic status, this paper focuses on how fertility decline leads to the improvement of women's status both within and outside of their families in China. Results from two national representative surveys conducted in 2000 and 2006 show that women with lower fertility perform less housework and also tend to be more satisfied with their status within the family than women with higher fertility.
Such effects are more pronounced for women in more recent marital cohorts. Across generations, lower fertility implies fewer siblings for the next generation and daughters tend to benefit more in terms of years of schooling and subsequently the status of their first occupations. The gender gap in educational attainment is negligible for the youngest cohort born after the implementation of the one-child policy since 1979. After taking into account the effect of education, we found no significant gender gap in occupational status attainment, however.
From the development policy perspective, investments in women and the promotion of gender equality are effective methods of controlling population growth in developing countries. On the other hand, as we see in China, reduced fertility also has the effect of enhancing women's status in marriages and the families, and girls with fewer siblings tend to benefit more in terms of schooling and subsequently in occupational attainment. Perhaps these are just a few of the many important but unintended consequences of fertility decline in China as well as in many other developing countries.
To address the consequences of fertility decline on the enhancement of women's status, analyses of cross-sectional data have several limitations. First, while we focus on women's status as the outcomes, indicated by the share of housework and perceived status within family, and education and employment in the society, women's power/autonomy relative to men's is a broad term that needs better measures at the micro-level in relation to their decisions on child births (e.g., Safilos-Rothshild 1982) . Second, the impact of child births on women's status may be endogenous in two respects. A wife with more power relative to her husband may do less housework, more satisfied with her status and also have more autonomy in making decisions on child births. Parents with higher expectations on their children's education may also limit their births, known as the "Endogenous Quality-Quantity Tradeoff" (Becker and Lewis 1973; Steelman et al. 2002) . Before better data and more rigorous identification strategies become available, one should be cautious to treat the relationship between fertility and women's status as causal. Finally, the paper has no evidence to link a woman's status within the family and her labor market status, as outlined in the analytic framework in Figure 1 , and women's status improvement is a complex concept that encompasses many dimensions, including education, safety, health, ability to make decisions, freedom of movement, and etc. which exist at multiple levels. Our analyses have been able to capture only a small but the most tangible part of it. We hope that future empirical research on China in this field will fill the void with the data from more carefully designs surveys and better measures.
Notes
